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Abstract
Some states treat a same-sex marriage as legally equal to a marriage between a man and a 
woman. Other states prohibit legal recognition of same-sex marriages in their constitutions. In 
every state that has a constitutional restriction against same-sex marriage, the amendment was 
passed by a popular vote.
The conventional wisdom about allowing voter participation in such decisions is that they 
yield constitutional outcomes that reflect attitude differences across states. We reexamine the 
attitude-amendment relationship and find it to be weaker than expected. We then develop an 
alternate explanation that focuses on procedural variations in how states amend their 
constitutions. Integrating this institutional information with attitudinal data yields an improved 
explanation of why states differ in their constitutional treatment of same-sex marriage today. Our 
findings have distinct implications for people who wish to understand and/or change the future 
status of same-sex couples in state constitutions.  
The legal status of a marriage between two men or two women is the subject of one of the 
most visible social debates in America today (Segura 2005). Some people see the matter as a 
moral issue and seek to protect traditional marriage norms by withholding legal recognition from 
same-sex marriages. Others see the legality of same-sex marriage as a civil rights issue. Many of 
these people seek equal recognition for such marriages so that lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgendered citizens may enjoy the same benefits of marriage as heterosexual couples (Herek 
2006).
In the United States, the legal status of same-sex relationships varies across states. Some 
states, like Massachusetts, accord all of the legal advantages of marriage to same-sex couples. 
Other states write into their constitutions language that prohibits same-sex unions from receiving 
equal treatment.  The number of states writing such restrictions into their constitutions surged in 
the decade spanning from Election Day 1998 to Election Day 2008.1
The constitutional status of same sex marriage is important because a constitutional 
amendment is the most powerful legal statement that a state can make about the issue. To see 
why, note that while state officials are obligated to enforce both statutes and constitutional 
amendments, the two forms of law differ in how they can be challenged in a state's legal system. 
Statutes can be challenged and overturned when they are found to be inconsistent with a state’s 
constitution (indeed, how state-level judges have interpreted same-sex marriage statutes are an 
important part of the current debate Matsusaka 2007 a,b). But amendments are constitutional by
definition. Hence, their legality is more difficult, and often impossible, to challenge in state 
courts.
1 The precipitating events of this era were decisions of State Supreme Courts in Hawaii and 
Massachusetts. These courts, in different ways, offered formal marriage rights to same-sex 
couples. These decisions, in turn induced states (who typically recognized marriages performed 
in other states) to react. 
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In this article, we examine why states differ in their constitutional treatment of same-sex 
marriages. We begin by noting that direct democracy has been used to pass all current state-level 
constitutional restrictions on such marriages. In every state except Delaware, citizens are 
empowered to participate in the amendment process in this way.  
When direct democracy is used to make laws, there exists substantial evidence that policy 
outcomes better reflect mass preferences (see Matsusaka 2004, 2007 a,b for comprehensive 
studies of this topic). Moreover, a comprehensive study of state legislatures reveals that they act 
in ways that are generally responsive to variances in public opinion across states (Erikson, 
Wright, and McIver 1993). Collectively, such studies support the view that the constitutional 
treatments of same-sex marriage differ across states because the citizens of constitutionally 
restrictive states have different attitudes about same-sex marriage than do citizens in 
constitutionally permissive states (see, e.g., Gamble 1997, Riggle, Thomas, and Rostosky 2005, 
Silver 2009). 
We have a different view. It is not that attitudes are irrelevant to constitutional outcomes. 
It is that the relationship between attitudes and outcomes is weaker than the conventional view 
suggests. This relationship is also weaker than a plausible alternative.
Our conclusions arise from the fact that states differ substantially in their requirements 
for constitutional change. Some states require little more than the assent of a majority of voters. 
Other states impose far higher barriers. In this paper, we show how specific institutional 
attributes condition the relationship between citizen attitudes about same sex-marriage and 
constitutional outcomes.  
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we use state-level polls to document how 
citizen attitudes about same-sex marriage relate to its constitutional status. We use this data to 
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characterize the attitude-amendment relationship and to establish a baseline against which we 
can compare other explanations. Our initial finding is that the relationship between attitudes and 
amendments is not as strong as the conventional wisdom suggests. For example, attitudes in 
many constitutionally restrictive states mirror attitudes in many constitutionally permissive 
states.
Second, we conduct a parallel analysis using a different factor: institutional variations. 
These institutional variations are based on one of two decisions that a state made decades or 
centuries before same-sex marriage debates emerged. Since these institutional decisions were 
made so long ago, they could not have been caused by current attitudes on same-sex marriage. 
Hence, they are exogenous to the attitudes-amendment relationship and can provide an alternate 
basis for explaining contemporary constitutional outcomes. 
The first institutional decision is whether or not the state permits citizens to place 
potential constitutional amendments on the ballot without legislative participation. The second 
institutional decision, for states that require legislative participation, is whether a single vote of a 
legislative majority along with the support of a simple voter majority is sufficient to amend the 
constitution. We find that simply categorizing states by these two institutional decisions better 
predicts the current constitutional status of same-sex couples than attitudes alone.  
Institutions, however, do not act as independent force on constitutional outcomes. 
Instead, they condition the relationship between attitudes and amendments in specific ways. 
Thus, when states make different institutional choices, we should systematic variance in attitude-
amendment relationships across states.  
Hence, our third analytic step entails the development of a threshold model that takes 
simultaneous account of voter attitudes and institutional specifics. We find that state-level 
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differences in the constitutional status of same sex marriages are better explained by an approach 
that explicitly integrates how institutions influence the relationship between attitudes and 
amendments into its logic. An implication of this analysis is that many states are constitutionally 
permissive of same-sex marriages today not because their citizens are “socially progressive,” but 
because their constitutions are difficult to amend.  
We end the paper with an assessment of the future of same-sex politics in state 
constitutions. We describe why we expect relatively few states to adopt new constitutional 
restrictions against same sex marriage. We also use our analysis to clarify the likely next 
strategies of people who wish to leverage anti-gay sentiment for constitutional change and of 
people who wish to undo recently passed constitutional restrictions against same-sex marriage. 
In all such cases, assessing how and where such strategies will succeed requires knowledge of 
how institutions condition the relationship between voter attitudes and constitutional outcomes.  
Do Amendments Follow Attitudes? 
We begin by evaluating the hypothesis that amendments follow attitudes or, putting 
matters more precisely, that state-level constitutional outcomes follow state-level public opinion 
variations. Our dependent variable is whether or not a state constitutional amendment prohibits 
same-sex couples from receiving the same legal treatment as married heterosexual couples.  To 
evaluate this hypothesis, we gathered state-level opinion data for the 47 states from which we 
could acquire comparable data on the topic of same-sex marriage.2 The states for which we 
2 Most of our data come from polls commissioned by high-circulation newspapers. In six cases, 
the data came from other sources. Our California data is from a poll conducted by the Public 
Policy Institute of California in October 2008. Florida: Quinnipiac University Poll, September 
2008. Idaho: 17th Annual Idaho Public Policy Survey, 2006. Louisiana: Statewide Survey of 
Louisiana Voters, March 2004. South Carolina: Winthrop University/ETV poll, February 2008. 
Wyoming: 2006 Wyoming Election Survey. See Appendix 1 for more information. In three cases 
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could not locate such data are Delaware (which does not allow citizens to vote on constitution
amendments), Mississippi and West Virginia.
al
3 In our "attitudes only" analysis we omit these 
three states. 
To permit comparability among polls, we searched for consistently-worded questions. 
We converged on two types: (1) questions that ask respondents whether they support or oppose a 
state constitutional amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman and (2) 
questions that ask whether the respondent favors or opposes gay marriage in general.4 Other 
questions, such as those inquiring about civil unions, were not sufficiently prevalent in state polls 
to be included in our analysis. We found no systematic relationship between question type and 
the percent of respondents opposed to same-sex marriage generally or a specific amendment. 
Therefore, we pool the two question types in our analyses.5 For consistency, we term both the 
(AL, NV, and SC), the polling data we could obtain occurred after state constitutional 
amendments passed.  
3 In these states, we contacted state-level party organizations as well as state-level gay rights 
organization and public universities (and their associated survey research operations) but were 
unable to locate a representative statewide poll covering the topic. 
4 We obtained amendment questions for the following states: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin.  We obtained general gay marriage questions 
for the following states: Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. In the cases of Louisiana and 
South Dakota we could only obtain questions that asked about a federal constitutional 
amendment. We could not locate any polling questions for Maine that asked only about an 
amendment or only about marriage. The question we used gave respondents a choice between 
marriage, civil unions and not marriage, or no legal recognition. To calculate the percentage of 
Maine respondents opposed to same-sex marriage we combined those who answered “no legal 
recognition” with those who answered “civil unions but not marriage.” In all cases except four, 
data are from 2004 or later. Connecticut and Texas are from 2003, and Hawaii and Alaska are 
from 1998. 
5 To consider whether there was any systematic relationship between type of question and public 
opinion results we ran a simple linear regression with public opinion as the dependent variable 
and a dummy variable indicating whether we located an “amendment” or “gay marriage” 
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proportion of people opposing same-sex marriage and the proportion of people supporting an 
amendment as the proportion of people who oppose same-sex marriage. 
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between state-level attitudes and constitutional outcomes 
for the 47 states. States are ordered by their attitudes about same-sex marriage. On the left side of 
the figure are states whose attitudes towards same-sex couples are more permissive. On the right 
side are states whose attitudes are more restrictive. We draw a horizontal line at the 50% level. 
Bars that stretch above this line are states in which a majority of citizens express restrictive 
attitudes.
The color of each bar reflects the current constitutional status of same-sex marriages. 
Green bars represent states that have passed restrictive amendments. Blue bars represent states 
with no such amendments. If amendments follow attitudes, there should be blue bars on the left 
and green bars on the right of Figure 1. There should be no mixing of colors in the middle.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.] 
Figure 1 shows that the relationship between amendments and attitudes is not as strong as 
the conventional wisdom suggests. At the extreme edges of the figure, the conventional wisdom 
performs well. For example, only 3 of the 10 states with the lowest levels of opposition have 
passed restrictive amendments, while 9 of 10 states with the highest levels of opposition have 
done so. But there is substantial mixing of colors in the middle.  
Another way to evaluate the conventional wisdom is as follows: treat “majority rule” as a 
baseline, as it is the typical voting rule for passing constitutional amendments via direct 
democracy in US states. If amendments follow attitudes and if majorities rule, then only states in 
which a majority of the public expresses restrictive attitudes should have a restrictive 
question in that state. We found no statistically-significant effect of question type on expressed 
opinion.
6
amendment. In other words, only bars that stretch above the 50% line should be green. Here, the 
conventional wisdom explains 31 of 47 states (66%).  In more than a few cases, amendments do 
not follow attitudes.6
Do Institutions Matter? 
US states employ different procedures for amending their constitutions. In this section, 
we examine how two institutional variables relate to the current constitutional status of same-sex 
marriages. One variable pertains to whether or not a state constitutional amendment can originate 
outside of the state legislature. The other variable reflects the amount of legislative effort and 
voter support that are needed to amend the constitution. After defining these variables, we use 
them to reexamine why states differ in their constitutional treatment of same-sex couples. 
DCI or Non-DCI? 
The first procedural variable affects whether or not constitutional amendments must 
originate in a state’s legislature. In fifteen states, citizens can place a potential constitutional 
amendment on the ballot without legislative participation or approval. Following Krislov and 
Katz (2008), we call this group Direct Constitutional Initiative (DCI) states. In all other states 
6 An alternative hypothesis is that our classification of constitutional outcomes into the category 
of having or not having a restrictive amendment masks important differences in the content of 
constitutional restrictions. To evaluate this alternative, we used Lambda Legal (LL)’s 
categorization of constitutional outcomes. LL places every US state into one of five classes. Its 
“lowest class” contains states that have “inequality written into the constitution.” Its “fourth 
class” includes states that have non-constitutional restrictions. The average percentage of opinion 
against same-sex marriages is 55% in the 10 LL fourth class states for which we have data and is 
59% in the 26 LL lowest class states for which we have data. This difference is neither large nor 
statistically significant. Within the “lowest class” states, LL makes a further distinction between 
constitutional restrictions that have “not provided protections to reduce the harm” and 
constitutional restrictions that “might be read to cause even more harm.” In the six “no 
protection” states for which we have data, the average percentage of opinion against same-sex 
marriage is 56%. In the 20 “might be read” states, the average is 60%. This difference is also not 
statistically significant. 
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except Delaware, constitutional amendments must be placed on the ballot by the legislature. We 
refer to these 34 states as “non-DCI.”
Potential amendments qualify for the ballot in DCI and non-DCI states in different ways. 
We will describe DCI state procedures first. In a DCI state, a proposal qualifies for the ballot if 
its supporters collect a required number of signatures from registered voters.7 The modal 
requirement is 10% of the total votes cast for governor in the state’s previous gubernatorial 
election. Today, nearly all signature collection efforts are accomplished by paying a professional 
firm to gather the needed signatures (Kousser and McCubbins 2005). So, to qualify for the ballot 
in a DCI state, the number of people supporting a proposed initiative not be big, but it helps if at 
least one or more of its supporters are rich enough to hire a competent signature collection firm.8
In a non-DCI state, placing a potential constitutional amendment on the ballot requires a 
different kind of effort. Non-DCI states require state legislatures to vote one or more times to 
qualify potential amendments for the ballot. Such efforts, if they are to succeed, require a broader 
supportive coalition than in DCI states. In a DCI state, a single person can – in principle -- draft 
an initiative and pay a firm to collect signatures from a relatively small percentage of a state’s 
residents. By contrast, legislators who seek constitutional change in non-DCI states formally 
require the support of at least a majority of legislators.  
Simple Non-DCI or Complex Non-DCI? 
7 We classify Illinois as a non-DCI state. In Illinois, DCIs are possible, but only for changes to 
Article IV of its constitution, whose scope is limited to the functioning of the legislature. So, any 
amendment to the Illinois constitution that pertains specifically to the legal status of same-sex 
couples would have to originate in the legislature. 
8 Unlike political parties that live on to fight multiple policy battles, many amendment-oriented 
groups disband soon after the election in which their proposal is considered (Boehmke 2005).  
Also noteworthy is the fact that many of the people who participate in writing the draft, paying 
the firm, or collecting the signatures need not be residents of the state (Bowler, Donovan, and 
Fernandez 1996). 
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The second procedural variable specifies whether or not non-DCI states have erected 
special barriers to constitutional change. To simplify the explanation of this variable, we sort 
non-DCI states into two categories: simple and complex. In the eighteen simple states, a single 
legislative vote is sufficient to place a potential amendment on the ballot and the support of a 
simple majority of voters is sufficient for the amendment to pass. The sixteen complex states 
have additional requirements that are atypical of the normal legislative process and/or of the 
typical state election. If a non-DCI state requires votes in two separate legislative sessions to 
place a potential amendment on the ballot or if a simple majority of votes on Election Day is 
insufficient for passage, we code the state as complex.9 Table 1 lists states by their institutional 
requirements for passing constitutional amendments.   
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Analysis
To what extent are present-day constitutional outcomes on same sex marriage related to 
these two procedural variables? From the procedural information just given, we can articulate a 
simple “amendments follow procedures” hypothesis. It has two parts:  
1. Since non-DCI states have the extra burden of achieving a legislative coalition before 
placing an amendment on the ballot, DCI states are more likely than non-DCI states to have 
restrictive amendments.10
9 The modal supermajority Election Day requirement in complex states is a majority of all votes 
cast. To see how this requirement works, suppose that 1,000,000 people vote in an election in a 
state that has the modal supermajority voting requirement. Suppose, moreover, that only 800,000 
cast a vote for or against the amendment. In this case, the amendment must get 500,001 votes (a 
majority of all votes cast) to pass. 
10 Implicit in this presentation is the assumption that if a restrictive amendment is placed on the 
ballot, it can gain a majority of votes on Election Day even if pre-election polls show a majority 
opposed to the election. Besides the observation that such an outcome has now occurred in every 
state that has put an amendment on the ballot, other factors support the validity of this 
assumption. One factor is social desirability in polls. Goldman (2008), for example, has 
identified a segment of the population that is both reticent to admit to an interviewer that they 
oppose gay marriage but quite likely to support a restrictive amendment in the privacy of a 
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2. Since changing the constitution in complex states requires broader legislative and/or 
voter support than in simple states, simple states are more likely than complex states to have 
restrictive amendments.  
How well does this hypothesis correspond to current outcomes? With respect to the first 
part of the hypothesis, the public has voted to constitutionally restrict same-sex marriages in all
fifteen DCI states. The same is not true in non-DCI states. The pattern in non-DCI states, 
however, is consistent with the hypothesis' second part. Ten of the nineteen simple non-DCI 
states (53%) have restrictive amendments. Only five out of sixteen (31%) complex non-DCI 
states have such restrictions. Hence, a crude version of the hypothesis that reads, “simple and 
DCI states will have restrictions, complex states will not” explains current constitutional 
outcomes in 36 of 50 states (72%).  This crude hypothesis performs at least as well as the 
“amendments follow attitudes” hypothesis.
Is the observed relationship between constitutional outcomes and procedural variations 
illusory? Perhaps citizens of DCI states are more opposed to same-sex marriage than citizens of 
non-DCI states. It could also be the case that citizens of simple non-DCI states are more opposed 
to same-sex marriage than citizens of complex non-DCI states. Figure 2 allows us to evaluate 
these possibilities. In this figure, the bars show the percentage of each institutional category 
(DCI/complex/simple) that has restrictive amendments. The red line connects three dots, where 
each dot represents the average percentage of citizens per state who oppose same-sex marriage in 
the given set of states. 
 [FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
voting booth.  A second factor is evidence that it is easier to motivate people who are opposed to 
same-sex marriage to go to the polls to defend their point of view than it is to motivate people 
who support equal marriage rights (see, e.g., Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith 2008).  
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Figure 2 reveals that the average of statewide opinions is nearly identical in the three 
categories of states. Hence, the figure reinforces the idea that differences in constitutional 
outcomes across states are not simply an artifact of amendments following attitudes. The present-
day state constitutional status of same-sex marriage corresponds at least as well to basic 
institutional decisions made long ago as it does to current state-by-state public opinion 
variations.
Integrating Institutions and Attitudes: A Threshold Model of Constitutional Change 
The previous section suggests that knowing whether or not a state allows direct 
constitutional initiatives and understanding how difficult amending the constitution is in non-
DCI states can help explain the current state constitutional status of same-sex marriage. These 
institutional attributes have explanatory power because they establish the voter and legislative 
support thresholds that constitutional change requires. In this section, we examine those 
thresholds more explicitly, integrate them with our polling data, and use the combination to offer 
an improved explanation of the current constitutional status of same sex marriage. 
 Figure 3 depicts our threshold model of constitutional change. The top of this figure 
represents the constitutional status of same-sex marriages as of the mid 1990s. At that time, no 
states had restrictive amendments. The bottom of the figure represents our expectation of the 
constitutional status of same-sex marriage today.  
[Figure 3 about here.] 
To pass an amendment, a procedural requirement and an Election Day requirement must
be satisfied simultaneously. By procedural requirement, we mean the percentage of votes in each 
chamber of a state's legislature that is required to place a potential amendment on the ballot. By 
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Election Day requirement, we mean the percentage of voters whose formal assent is required to 
pass a potential amendment. 
Since citizens in a DCI state can place a constitutional amendment on a ballot directly, 
legislators in DCI states do not cast a formal vote. Hence, the procedural requirement in DCI 
states is "zero." Moreover, the typical DCI state Election Day requirement is a simple majority.11
With respect to both requirements, there is more variation across non-DCI states. Table 2 lists 
detailed requirements for these states.  
 [Table 2 about here.] 
Using the threshold model and the Table 2 information, we generate an estimate of what 
the constitutional status of same sex marriages should be in every non-DCI state. To generate 
state-specific predictions of constitutional outcomes, we need to make an assumption about what 
state legislatures in non-DCI states will do when faced with the opportunity to change the 
constitutional status of same sex marriages. Such an assumption, in turn, requires knowledge of 
the preferences of individual state legislators.  This is a difficult task. There are a wide range of 
political traditions across the 50 states. Moreover, each state legislature tackles distinct topical 
agendas under a variety of different rules. Hence, there is no central database from which we can 
draw comparable, direct, and reliable conclusions about state legislators’ preferences. Yet, there 
are two assumptions about these preferences that we can make using data from other sources. 
First, we assume that where the constitutional status of same-sex marriage is contested on 
partisan grounds, Republican legislators will support placing restrictive constitutional 
amendments on the ballot. Preservation of traditional definitions of marriage is, for many social 
11 The exceptions are Florida (which requires 60% of votes cast for or against the proposal), 
Nebraska (which requires 50% of votes cast for or against the proposal and 40% of the total 
votes cast in the election), and Nevada (which requires voter majorities in two consecutive 
general elections). 
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conservatives, a vitally important issue. As social conservatives are a core component of 
Republican Party supporters across the country, we expect Republican state legislators to support 
ballot access for restrictive amendments. 
 Our second assumption, about Democratic state legislators, is more nuanced. While both 
of the major parties have colorful histories and while members of neither party are in complete 
agreement about all issues, the most prominent within-party split of the last 100 years is between 
southern and non-Southern Democrats. We expect non-southern Democrats to oppose placing 
restrictive amendments on the ballot and we expect southern Democrats to support such 
placements.  
Two votes in the US Congress, taken ten years apart, are the main evidence we present in 
support of these two assumptions. The first vote occurred in 1996, when Congress voted on the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). This act allows states to disregard same-sex marriages 
granted by other states and prevents the federal government from recognizing such marriages. 
The bill passed by margins of 85-14 in the Senate and 342-67 in the House.  
All 53 Senate Republicans (100%) supported DOMA as did 224 of 225 (99.6%) of House 
Republicans who cast a vote. Southern Democrats acted similarly. Seven of eight (88%) of 
southern Democratic senators voted for DOMA, as did 42 of 48 southern Democratic House 
members (88%). Non-southern Democrats were more split. Two thirds of non-southern 
Democratic senators (25/38) supported the bill as did just over half of the non-southern House 
Democrats who cast a vote (77/136).  
Ten years later, a constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage was 
introduced in the House (HJ RES 88) and the Senate (SJ RES 1). In the Senate, a motion to 
consider the bill was killed by a party line vote. In the House, the resolution failed by a vote of 
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236-187. The bill was supported by 88% of voting House Republicans (202/229) and by 18% of 
voting House Democrats (34/193). Amongst Democrats, however, the regional split continued to 
persist. Almost half of the southern Democrats who voted (26/55) supported the bill. Outside the 
South, only 6% of House members who voted (8/138) did the same.12
To be sure, ours is a crude assumption that is certainly false in important cases. 13  We 
know of Republicans and southern Democrats who have opposed constitutional restrictions 
against same-sex marriage and we know of non-Southern Democrats who support restrictions. 
However, given the evidence that we have reviewed, the assumption works as a simple and 
relatively accurate representation of how various legislators tend react to proposals that would 
affect the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. 
To generate a set of expectations about the constitutional status of same-sex marriage in 
non-DCI states, we integrate the procedural information from each state with the poll data from 
earlier in the paper, the legislative preferences assumption just stated, and data on the partisan 
makeup of non-DCI state legislators.14 We do this for every state and every year from 1997 to 
12 Other scholars also find this difference between southern and non-southern Democrats. In 
analyzing environmental policy, Shipan and Lowry (2001) find a systematic difference between 
the average score assigned to southern and non-southern Democrats in Congress by the League 
of Conservation Voters. This difference leads the authors to form the following hypothesis: “The 
higher the percentage of Democrats who are from the South, the closer ideologically the party 
will be to the Republicans and therefore the smaller the divergence in environmental voting 
scores” (252).  Moreover, Shipan and Lowry find that “As expected, the South measure has a 
negative correlation with divergence. The lower the percentage of southerners in the Democratic 
party, the more different the party is from the Republicans and the wider the divergence” (259).  
13 In the spirit of transparency, we will note that it was not our initial intent to make this 
assumption. However, the importance of this regional split within the Democratic Party became 
apparent after we collected information on state legislatures. 
14 We integrate institutional provisions with public opinion data as follows. First, we use Carl 
Klarner’s dataset on partisanship in state legislatures (accessed via the State Politics & Policy 
Quarterly Data Resource). As Klarner’s data contained information through 2007, we obtained 
2008 data from the National Conference of State Legislatures.  To consider whether there was a 
sufficient number of Republican legislators (sufficiency based on the institutional requirements) 
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2008. If a state ever satisfied both the election day and legislative thresholds in a single year (or 
if it satisfied these requirements in consecutive years as some complex non-DCI states require), 
then our expectation is that the state will have a constitutional amendment. Table 3 documents 
these expectations. 
 [Table 3 about here.] 
Our expectations are correct in 42 of 49 states for a cumulative success rate of 86%.15 16
This is twenty percentage points higher than the success rate of the "amendments follow 
to pass the bill, we focused on the partisan breakdown of both houses of the legislature from 
1997 to 2008. As we could not precisely estimate how public opinion would translate to 
outcomes where state policy required that an amendment must obtain majority of all votes cast to 
pass, we simply considered whether or not a simple majority of citizens opposed same-sex 
marriage.   
15 The numbers in both the numerator (states predicted correctly) and the denominator (total 
states in study) reflect the availability of poll data. Recall that there are three states –Delaware, 
Mississippi and West Virginia for which we have no polls. The fact that Delaware and West 
Virginia never meet the legislative requirements necessary to begin the amendment process is 
sufficient for us generate an expectation: we expect no amendment in these states. However, the 
fact that we do not have public opinion for these two states they are excluded from Figure 4.  
Mississippi's legislature, on the other hand, does meet the legislative requirement. Since 
Mississippi's Election Day requirement is a simple majority in support of changing the 
constitution, If we had a poll showing majority support for a constitutional restriction (and it is 
worth noting that the 2004 constitutional ballot measure banning same-sex marriage in 
Mississippi passed with over 86% of the vote), our expectation would be that Mississippi would 
have one.  But we have no such data for Mississippi. Hence, we exclude it from this part of the 
analysis.
16 Our results in this section are a product of the polling data described earlier in the paper. It is 
reasonable to ask about the extent to which our results are sensitive to other plausible measures 
of state-level attitudes on same-sex marriage. Lax and Phillips (2009) have generated such 
estimates using a very rigorous approach that includes multilevel regression and 
poststratification. Relying on a dataset of 26 national polls conducted between 1996 and 2005, 
they model individual responses as a function of demographic characteristics and state of 
residence. Next, the authors conduct a poststratification where estimates for each respondent type 
are weighted by the percentage of each respondent type in actual state populations. This 
produces state-level estimates of public opinion on same-sex marriage. This work constitutes an 
important substantive advance. 
We replicated our analysis using Lax and Phillips’s (2009) measures of public opinion instead of 
our own. There are no states for which the Lax and Phillips estimates improve our original 
explanation. In fact, using their data yields different predictions in two cases: Iowa and Indiana. 
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attitudes" hypothesis and twelve percentage points higher than the “amendments follow 
procedures” hypothesis.17
Of course, one could argue that because we have used an assumption about legislative 
preferences to derive this revised estimate, attitudes have found their way back into the 
explanation. To the extent that attitudes lead voters to choose some legislators rather than others, 
it is certainly true that such attitudes help to produce the explanatory improvement of our 
approach. But any such effect is indirect and necessarily limited by the fact that voters choose 
state legislators for a wide range of reasons – only one (at most) of which is the legislator's view 
on the constitutional status of same-sex marriage. Put in more general terms, our argument is not 
that attitudes are irrelevant to the pattern of constitutional amendments on same-sex marriage. 
Our argument is that explaining why state constitutions differ in their treatment of same sex 
marriage requires more than just information about voter attitudes. It also requires knowledge of 
the institutions that define relevant legislative and voter support thresholds.
Figure 4 contains another way to depict the explanatory benefits of looking beyond 
attitudes to explain why states vary in their constitutional treatments of same-sex marriage. Its 
In both cases, using our data with our model yields the correct prediction but using our model 
with the Lax and Phillips estimates yield the wrong prediction. A likely cause of this difference 
is that while we base our state-level estimates on fewer polls than Lax and Phillips, the polls we 
use are newer. The national trend towards permissiveness in attitudes towards same-sex marriage 
may explain why our measure produces less public opposition to same-sex marriage in those 
states.
17 In Appendix 2, we examine the seven states for which our estimations were incorrect. A 
summary of that appendix is as follows. In Alaska and Kansas, a small number of democrats 
voting contrary to the broad assumptions of this section were sufficient to render our expectation 
incorrect. In Wyoming and Pennsylvania, there have been enough Republican defections from 
amendment proposals to block ballot access. In North Carolina, our expectation was undermined 
by a significant number of "southern" democrats voting like non-southern democrats. In 
Kentucky, our expectation was undermined by the opposite being true. Our coding of Hawaii as 
"incorrect" relies on a technicality. Technically, Hawaii does not have an amendment that 
literally renders same-sex marriage constitutional, which is what we expect. However, it does 
have an amendment that yields the same outcome, so we code our expectation as incorrect. 
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content is the same set of bars that inhabited Figure 1. Recall, from that figure, that the color of 
each bar reflects the current constitutional status of same-sex couples in a given state. Green bars 
represent states where amendments have passed. Blue bars represent states with no such 
amendments.  
[Figure 4 about here.] 
Now, we sort these bars into three categories: DCI states, non-DCI states where poll 
information or the partisanship of state legislators lead us to expect no amendment, and non-DCI 
states poll information or the partisanship of state legislators lead us to expect an amendment. 
Sorting states in this way yields nearly solid color blocks. This outcome, unlike that seen in 
Figure 1, reinforces the idea that variations in relevant constitutional procedures are critical in 
explaining why states differ in their constitutional treatment of same sex marriage. 
Our findings further imply that states like California, Colorado, and Michigan, which 
currently have constitutional restrictions against same-sex couples though public opinion on the 
matter is nearly evenly split, would have different outcomes if they were non-DCI states with 
supermajority legislative requirements. In other words, our estimates imply that there is not 
enough public opposition to same-sex marriages in such states to induce their legislatures to 
propose restrictive amendments. By contrast, we estimate that states such as Maryland, 
Minnesota, and Virginia, which do not have constitutional restrictions against same-sex 
marriage, would do so if they were DCI states. These states are constitutionally permissive of 
same-sex couples today not because their citizens are more permissive on the issue of same-sex 
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marriage than many of the other states listed in this table, but because their constitutions are 
harder to amend.18
Before moving to a discussion about the implications of our findings, we briefly compare 
our findings to other recent work. Like us, Matsusaka (2007 a, b) argues that institutions 
condition the relationship between public opinion and policy outcomes. His main explanatory 
variables reflect how states implement the initiative process and the primary means of empirical 
inference is statistical.  
Matsusaka's analysis derives important explanatory power from a variable measuring 
whether or not judges stand for election (also see Besley and Payne 2005). His argument for this 
effect is that because the threat of elections should limit exercises of judicial discretion that 
counter public opinion, policy outcomes are more likely to reflect public opinion when judges 
are elected. We examined this hypothesis with our data. In 26 of the 37 (70%) judge-election 
states for which we have polling data, the state constitutional status of same-sex marriage 
matches state-level attitudes. The same is true in 7 of the 10 (70%) non-election states for which 
we have data. Hence, in the case we are studying (state constitutional amendments), the election 
of judges appears to offer no explanatory improvement. This difference in results is likely due to 
18 This claim is consistent with findings by scholars such as Bowler and Donovan (2004), Gerber 
(1996), Gerber and Hug (2003), and Matsusaka (2004), who show how institutional variations 
such as the magnitude of signature requirements affect the frequency of direct democracy usage. 
It also complements Haider-Markel (2001). He argues (2001:5) that the diffusion of same-sex 
marriage bans across states "is best explained by the presence of an organized national campaign 
by conservative religious groups, the local resources of interest groups, and other internal state 
characteristics." Our effort complements his by providing an answer to the question "Why would 
conservative religious groups organize in some states and not others?" One possibility is that the 
groups organize where their members are. Another, more strategic, possibility suggested by our 
work is that these groups believe that the likely policy return on their campaign investments 
depend on the institutional variables described in our paper. If they combine this information 
with the kinds of local knowledge that Haider-Markel describes, they could well conclude that 
their best response is to invest their resources in states where the procedural and Election Day 
requirements specified above are achievable. 
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the fact that we focus exclusively on constitutional amendments, while Matsusaka focuses 
primarily on statutes. As we described in the introduction, judges can overturn statutes that they 
find to be inconsistent with a state’s constitution. But amendments are constitutional by 
definition. Since an amendment's legality is more difficult, and often impossible, to challenge in 
state courts, amendments offer less opportunity for the kind of judicial discretion that statutory 
interpretation can allow (see, e.g., Eskridge 1994). Hence, the effect of judicial elections found 
by Matsusaka should have the same relevance to our analysis. 
Lax and Phillips (2009:i), by contrast, find that “[s]tate political institutions do not 
condition policy responsiveness” to public opinion on policies affecting the GLBT community. 
They conclude (2009: 31) that, "The attention paid in the discourse surrounding gay rights to the 
role of state political institutions in hindering or advancing the gay rights movement may be 
misplaced." This is the opposite of our finding. Two factors may explain the difference. First, 
with respect to same-sex marriage, Lax and Phillips's dependent variable is whether or not states 
allow it. At the time they did their work, two states allowed it and forty-eight did not. Hence, 
their dependent variable has almost no variance. Second, Lax and Phillips derive their claim 
from multivariate regressions where the effect of the institutional variables we are discussing in 
this paper are represented by the coefficient of an interaction term between public opinion and a 
dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not a state uses the direct initiative process for 
statutes and/or amendments. In other words, their treatment ignores the voter and legislative 
thresholds that form the core of our approach. Given the lack of variance in their dependent 
variable and the absence of a threshold-based logic in their argument, the lack of statistical 
significance of their coefficient is not surprising and is an extraordinarily weak indicator of the 
proposition that political institutions do not affect the relationship between attitudes and policy 
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outcomes. Put another way, focusing on whether or not a state allows initiatives is an important 
step in explaining attitude-outcome relationship, but stopping there is equivalent to assuming that 
the additional procedural and election day requirements described earlier in this section are 
inconsequential. Our results suggest that the thresholds are quite consequential in explaining the 
current variation in how state constitutions treat same-sex marriages. 
The Future of Political Action and the Legality of Same-Sex Marriage 
 To this point, we have focused on the question of whether a state will come to have a 
constitutional restriction after not having one. There has not yet been a case where a state 
reverses a restrictive amendment (by passing a new amendment that is less restrictive). However, 
many polls suggest that Americans are becoming gradually more tolerant of gay marriage 
(Franklin 2008).19 Suppose this trend continues.  We can use a simple extension of our model to 
yield predictions about which states are most and least likely to change their constitutional 
treatment of same-sex marriage. 
 We expect that if attitudes shift in a more permissive direction, DCI states where a simple 
majority of voters is required to pass an amendment will be the first to pass permissive 
amendments. For strategic reasons, activists who seek greater permissiveness may not go directly 
to a call to full equality for same-sex marriages (see. e.g., Penn 2008 an explication of the logic 
of such a choice), but political entrepreneurs may see opportunities to win a majority of votes for 
proposals to lessen the severity of existing constitutional restrictions. They may, for example, 
seek amendments about matters such as hospital visitations or they may seek expanded rights for 
civil unions. In states such as California, Colorado or Michigan, where poll numbers suggest 
19 Research about why beliefs are evolving as they are continues to clarify how and why people 
come to have beliefs relevant to same-sex marriages (see, .e.g., Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2008). 
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bare majorities currently in favor of restrictions, relatively small changes in opinion could 
provide an opportunity for less restrictive amendments to proceed. Stating this notion more 
generally, an increase in permissive attitudes would – all else constant – be more likely to lead to 
constitutional changes in DCI states than they would in states where constitutions are more 
difficult to amend. For once a majority of voters in a DCI state come to favor greater 
permissiveness, it would only take a small group of policy entrepreneurs to write a new law, 
collect a sufficient number of signatures, and prevail at the polls.  
 By contrast, the prospects for undoing restrictive amendments in non-DCI states at any 
time in the near future are bleak. Following our logic, a non-DCI state should move from being 
constitutionally restrictive to constitutionally permissive only if two conditions are satisfied. First, 
it must have once been the case that “% Restrictive Legislators > Procedural Requirement” and 
“% Restrictive Voters > Election Day Requirement.” Many non-DCI states have satisfied this 
condition. Second, at some point in the future, it must be the case that “% Permissive Legislators 
> Procedural Requirement” and “% Permissive Voters > Election Day Requirement,” where 
"permissive legislators" and "permissive voters" refer to people who would support a future 
constitutional amendment that is more permissive of same-sex marriage. No non-DCI state that 
has passed a restrictive amendment has yet satisfied this condition.
Indeed, this second condition implies that a substantial change in legislative attitudes is 
required for permissive constitutional shifts. For example, in a state where two-thirds of a 
legislature is required to place a restrictive amendment on the ballot, two-thirds of the same body 
will be required to place a permissive amendment on the ballot. Hence, a permissive 
constitutional shift will require a change in the views of at least one-third of the legislature. 
Barring an unprecedented acceleration of permissive attitude changes amongst Republicans or 
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southern Democrats, or wholesale changes in many state-level partisan voting patterns, it is 
likely to be a very long time before many non-DCI states will be capable of making their 
constitutions more permissive.  
An exception is Wisconsin. There, public opposition to same-sex marriage already hovers 
close to 50% and Republican majorities in both houses have been shrinking.  Moreover, in 
Wisconsin an amendment can be proposed by a simple majority of legislators in both houses and 
can be approved by a simple majority of voters. Hence, Wisconsin is one non-DCI state where 
greater constitutional permissiveness towards same-sex couples does not seem out of reach.  
Idaho, by contrast, is an example of a state where a more permissive constitutional 
treatment of same sex couples is very unlikely even though its poll numbers are not too 
dissimilar from those of Wisconsin or Colorado. Although public opinion in support of an 
amendment is also close to 50%, both houses of the Idaho legislature have strong Republican 
majorities. In 2008, for example, Republicans comprised 80% of Idaho’s upper house and 73% 
of the lower house. Given that Idaho law requires a 2/3 vote in each house to propose a 
constitutional amendment, over half of the Republican legislators in Idaho would have to come 
to support greater permissiveness, Democrats would have to make gains of historical proportions, 
or one would need a sufficiently large combination of Democratic victories and Republican 
attitude changes to enable any kind of constitutional shift toward constitutional permissiveness.   
 Our predictions contrast with others who have analyzed potential reversals of restrictive 
amendments. For example, Silver (2009) predicts that Idaho will pass a permissive amendment 
before Wisconsin and that a DCI state such as Michigan would pass a permissive amendment 
well after many non-DCI states that have strong Republican legislative majorities. These and 
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other importance differences in our expectations arise because Silver's analysis focuses only on 
opinions and ignores varying institutional thresholds. 
Having addressed the prospects for greater constitutional permissiveness towards same-
sex marriage, we can use the same approach to generate expectations for new constitutional 
restrictions on same-sex couples. In this case, the implications of our study are mixed. We expect 
that state constitutional restrictions on same-sex marriage will cease to be a focal political issue 
in coming years. The reason has little to do with an expectation of changing attitudes, though we 
are compelled by longitudinal analyses that document slow changes in a more permissive 
direction (Franklin 2008). Instead, our expectation is driven by the observation that all of the 
"low hanging fruit" has now been picked. As we have argued, constitutional changes are easiest 
to achieve in DCI states. In the elections of November 2008, the remaining three DCI states that 
did not have constitutional amendments restricting same-sex marriage (Arizona, California, and 
Florida) passed them. No more opportunities like this are available. If more states are to pass 
restrictive amendments, legislatures will have to be involved and, in most cases, large legislative 
supermajorities will have to openly support such measures.  
According to our data, there are very few states where new restrictive amendments are 
likely to occur in the next few years. The best bet is Wyoming where Republicans are numerous 
in both legislative chambers. Other states could also move in this direction with Republican 
legislative gains or the emergence of Democrats who are willing to support restrictive 
amendments. If such moves occur in 2010 or 2012, restrictive amendments in non-DCI states 
like Pennsylvania could be back on the table.
 While we expect the constitutional status of same-sex marriage to wane as a focal issue in 
state politics, our data also suggest that political entrepreneurs may tap public apprehensions 
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about same sex couples in other ways. One way involves restrictions on adoption. In 2008, 
Arkansas passed by popular vote a statutory restriction on gay adoption. This is not an issue for 
which we have multi-state public opinion data comparable to that of gay marriage. If, however, 
there is a high correlation between opposition to gay marriage and opposition to gay adoption, 
then we would expect to see political entrepreneurs try to increase the salience of this issue. If 
the entrepreneurs can succeed, we expect that the pattern of constitutional restrictions on gay 
adoption will not follow attitudes alone. In particular, we would first expect to see this issue 
appear as proposed constitutional amendments in DCI states and in southern states. 
More generally, our efforts can speak to the general matter of how much opinion change 
will be needed to change or preserve current constitutional outcomes. For as long as majorities of 
voters are against treating same-sex marriages the same way as heterosexual marriages, we can 
expect states that currently have restrictions to keep them. If attitudes were to shift in a 
permissive direction, constitutional changes could follow. Using the logic stated above, we 
would expect DCI states to be quickest to react. Given the relatively small number of people 
required to qualify a proposed amendment for ballot access in DCI states, a small group of 
advocates paired with enough money to satisfy the signature requirement would have a strong 
incentive to seize the first possible opportunity to reverse the restriction. Those seeking change 
in non-DCI states face higher barriers. There, greater legislative and/or voter support is required. 
So, compared to other states, the current constitutional outcome is “locked in.” In general, those 
who wish to change or preserve the content of state constitutions will be more effective if they 
base their strategies on knowledge of the rules by which states convert legislative efforts and 
mass attitudes into constitutional outcomes. 
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Before concluding this section on implications, we would like to address a 
methodological topic that some readers have brought up. To this point in the paper, we have been 
purposefully conservative in a key aspect of our presentation. We have described our theoretical 
framework as applying to the constitutional status of same-sex marriage across states. That said, 
we recognize that the basic methodological distinction we are making is more broadly 
applicable. Specifically, our method has been to highlight a contrast between an approach to 
explaining policy outcomes that focuses on attitudes only and an approach that self-consciously 
incorporates institutional attributes into the logical structure of the analysis. As a general matter, 
we share the view that attempts to integrate attitudinal and institutional factors are of high 
potential value for political science. We see this effort as a modest step in that direction. 
Conclusion
US state constitutions differ widely in their legal treatment of same sex couples. While 
Americans surely do differ in how they feel about this topic, state-level variations in such 
attitudes are insufficient to explain contemporary constitutional outcomes. Better explanations 
come from integrating this information with knowledge of the institutions that convert public 
sentiment into constitutional change. 
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, c
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: D
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 c
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 b
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ro
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 p
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t b
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 g
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 o
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 c
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f D
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l m
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 D
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 b
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 p
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f p
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 b
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 c
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d.
 
K
an
sa
s 
Po
ll:
Th
e 
W
ic
hi
ta
 E
ag
le
 &
 
K
W
C
H
 1
2 
Ey
ew
itn
es
s N
ew
s 
M
ay
 2
00
4 
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m
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 b
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, c
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t f
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itu
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ra
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 o
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 b
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 p
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t f
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 m
ar
ria
ge
); 
31
.8
%
 o
pp
os
e 
an
y 
le
ga
l 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f g
ay
 c
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 c
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t g
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 b
ac
k 
ci
vi
l u
ni
on
s, 
31
%
 o
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, c
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t c
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 d
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 D
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 re
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l b
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 o
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 c
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r o
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 c
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 b
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: D
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r o
r o
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 m
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s m
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 o
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l b
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r o
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t b
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 g
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re
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t m
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 b
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s t
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Appendix 2. Our Incorrect Expectations 
Alaska:
Our expectation is that Alaska would not have a constitutional restriction. In Alaska, 2/3 
of each legislative chamber is required to place a potential amendment on the ballot. In 1998, the 
Alaska Senate was 70% Republican and the House was 62.5% Republican. On straight party line 
votes, the Republicans in 20-member Senate would have been able to place an amendment on the 
ballot by a party line vote, but the 40-member House would have been two votes short. However, 
the proposal passed in both Houses.
The House vote on SJR 42 occurred on May 11, 1998. Thirty-five of forty House 
members (88%) voted as we anticipated – Republicans voted for the bill, Democrats voted 
against. The five exceptions, however, led to the bill's passage. Four of 15 Democrats (Foster, 
Ivan, Moses, and Williams) supported placing the amendment on the ballot. One of 25 
Republicans (Bunde) voted against. The bill passed by a vote of 28-12. 
Hawaii 
Our expectation is that Hawaii would not have a constitutional restriction. Hawaii, 
however, presents a unique challenge. For many people, the modern debate over same-sex 
marriage began with a 1993 Hawaii state Supreme Court decision that prohibited the state from 
denying marriage rights to same-sex couples. In 1998, the state became the first to take an 
explicit constitutional action about same-sex marriage by a popular vote. The amendment 
allowed the state legislature to enact a ban on same-sex marriage, which it subsequently did.  
Strictly speaking, the Hawaii constitution does not directly ban same sex-marriage, which 
is consistent with our expectation. However, the amendment effectively produced such a ban by 
leaving the matter to the legislature. Given that the legislature has been traditionally controlled 
by Democrats, our expectation is that the legislature would have rescinded its ban at some point 
perhaps even to the extent that it sought to reverse the 1998 amendment. This expectation is 
fueled by the fact that state public opinion polls suggest that Hawaiians have become 
substantially more permissive towards same-sex marriage (Wu 2008).
As a non-DCI state, legislative support would be required to change the constitution. 
Both chambers of the state legislature have Democratic majorities far in excess of the numbers 
required to qualify an initiative. While some Hawaii Republicans favor legalization, we count 
our expectation for Hawaii as being false because Hawaii Democrats are divided on the matter 
(Wu 2008). So while conversations about legalization continue, the legislature has not yet taken 
concrete steps in this direction. 
Kansas:
Our expectation is that Kansas would not have a constitutional restriction. In Kansas, 2/3 
of each legislative chamber is required to place a potential amendment on the ballot. In 2004, the 
legislature considered a proposal, HCR 5005, to place a restrictive constitutional amendment on 
the ballot. The proposal passed in the heavily Republican Senate but failed in the less-
Republican House.
In 2005, a new proposal with identical language was introduced. That year, the Senate 
was 75% Republican, and the proposal passed in that chamber with 72% of the vote. In the lower 
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house, 83 of 125 (66.4%) members were Republicans. This would have left Republicans one 
vote short of a majority on a party line vote.  
The House voted on SCR 1601 on February 2, 2005. Sixty-eight of eighty-one 
Republicans (84%) voted in favor as did eighteen of 42 Democrats. While three-quarters of the 
legislature voted as we anticipated, the divergence from a party line vote amongst Kansas 
Democrats was sufficient to pass the bill. The bill passed by a vote of 86 to 37.
Kentucky:
 Our expectation is that Kentucky would not have a constitutional amendment as it is 
considered a non-Southern state and over the past 10 years Republicans have always been a 
minority in the lower house. In 2004, Senate Bill 245 proposed amending the constitution to 
prohibit same-sex marriage. The bill passed the House on April 12 by a vote of 85-11 and passed 
the Senate on April 13 by a vote of 33-5. Given that at the time there were 16 Democrats in the 
Senate and 63 (a majority) Democrats in the House, these votes suggest that the bill was 
supported by a majority of Kentucky Democrats. Hence, our expectation for Kentucky fails 
because Kentucky Democrats have acted differently than most non-Southern Democrats. Indeed, 
from the pattern of legislative votes on this bill, Kentucky resembles a southern state.
North Carolina:
Since North Carolina is a southern state and since a majority of voters are opposed to 
same-sex marriage, our expectation is that it would have a constitutional restriction. While there 
is no constitutional restriction in the state, North Carolina passed a statutory ban on same-sex 
marriages in 1996. Since 1996, the North Carolina legislature has never seen a Republican 
majority in the Senate, and has been almost evenly split between Republicans and Democrats in 
the House. At various times in recent years, legislative proposals for a restrictive constitutional 
amendment have surfaced, but these attempts have been blocked by Democratic legislators 
(Beckwith 2008). Hence, our expectation for North Carolina fails because North Carolina 
Democrats have acted differently than most other Southern Democrats. 
Pennsylvania:
 Our expectation is that Pennsylvania would have a restrictive constitutional amendment 
given polling data on voter attitudes, the fact that legislative majorities in consecutive sessions 
are sufficient to place a potential amendment on the ballot, and the fact that Republicans 
controlled both legislative chambers over multiple legislative sessions. Pennsylvania does 
prohibit same sex marriage at the statutory level. It adopted DOMA as state law in 1996.
The closest that Pennsylvania came to placing a constitutional amendment on the ballot 
was in 2006. In that year, the state Assembly passed a vote to place a restriction on the ballot by 
a vote of 136-61. The Senate then passed a similar bill by a 38-12 vote. Nearly all Republicans in 
both legislative chambers supported the bills. While this Republican support was sufficient to 
pass the bills, the wide margins are the result of a significant number of Democrats in each 
chamber also supporting the bills. With these outcomes in hand, the process ground to a halt. The 
House and Senate bills were not identical. The Senate's bill did not prohibit civil unions and 
domestic partnerships. In subsequent months, the House and Senate were not able to reconcile 
their differences. Soon, thereafter, Republicans lost majority control of the Assembly. Efforts to 
place a restrictive amendment on the ballot, while discussed, have not again progressed as far as 
they did in 2006. 
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Wyoming:
Our expectation is that Wyoming would have a constitutional restriction. Wyoming is 
one of a handful of states that had a statute restricting marriage in Wyoming to a man and a 
woman prior to DOMA. Changing the constitution requires assent by two-thirds of each 
legislative chamber and support of a majority of all voters voting in an election. Since 1998, 
however, Republicans have retained strong majorities (70% or more) in both of Wyoming’s 
houses. Given that Wyoming has long had substantial Republican majorities in both chambers of 
its state legislature and polls that suggest substantial support for a constitutional restriction, our 
expectation is that Wyoming would have one. But Wyoming, which calls itself "The Equality 
State," has not pursued such an amendment. We do not have a good explanation for this 
outcome; though it has been pointed out to us that the Wyoming legislature has extremely short 
legislative sessions and that religion-based conservative interest groups are not as powerful in 
Wyoming as elsewhere. That said, in early 2009, a number of socially conservative groups from 
other states, such as Focus on the Family, have concentrated their efforts on Wyoming in an 
attempt to have a constitutional restriction passed.
33
References
Beckwith, Ryan Teague. 2008. "North Carolina Likely to Avoid Referendum" Charlotte News 
and Observer, November 17. Archived at http://projects.newsobserver.com/tags/gay_marriage 
Besley, Timothy, and A. Abigail Payne. 2005. "Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: 
Does Judicial Selection Matter?" Manuscript, London School of Economics and McMaster 
University.
Boehmke, Frederick J. 2005. The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation: How Institutions Shape 
Interest Group Systems. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press. 
Bowler, Shaun, and Todd Donovan. 2004. "Measuring the Effect of Direct Democracy on State 
Policy: Not All Initiatives Are Created Equal." State Politics and Policy Quarterly 4(3): 345-
363.
Bowler, Shaun, Todd Donovan and Ken Fernandez. 1996. "The Growth of the Political 
Marketing Industry and the California Initiative Process." European Journal of Marketing 
30(10/11): 166-178. 
Donovan, Todd, and Shaun Bowler. 1997. “Direct Democracy and Minority Rights: Opinions on 
Anti-Gay and Lesbian Ballot Initiatives.” In Stephanie L. Witt and Suzanne McCorkle (eds.), 
Anti-Gay Rights: Assessing Voter Initiatives. Westport, CT: Prager.  
Donovan, Todd, Caroline J. Tolbert, and Daniel A. Smith. 2008. “Priming Presidential Votes by 
Direct Democracy.” Journal of Politics 70: 1217-1231. 
Erikson, Robert S, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1993. Statehouse Democracy: Public 
Opinion and Policy in the American States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Eskridge, William N, Jr. 1994. Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Franklin, Charles. 2008. "Gay Marriage Support and Opposition." Posted on May 21 on 
http://www.pollster.com/blogs/gay_marriage_support_and_oppos.php. 
Gamble, Barbara. 1997. “Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote.” American Journal of Political 
Science 41(1): 245.269. 
Gerber, Elisabeth R. 1996. “Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives.” American
Journal of Political Science 40(1), 99-128. 
Gerber, Elisabeth, and Simon Hug. 2003. “Minority Rights and Direct Legislation: Theory, 
Methods, and Evidence.” Manuscript, University of Michigan and Institut fur 
Politikwissenchaft.
34
35
Goldman, Seth. 2008. "Is It Ok to be Anti-Gay? Social Desirability, Elite Discourse, and 
Expressions of Intolerance." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual 
National Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL. 
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 2001. “Policy Diffusion as a Geographical Expansion of the Scope of 
Political Conflict.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 1(1):5-26. 
Haider-Markel, Donald P., and Mark Joslyn. 2008. “Understanding Beliefs about the Origins of 
Homosexuality and Subsequent Support for Gay Rights: An Empirical Test of Attribution 
Theory.” Public Opinion Quarterly 72:291-310. 
Herek, Gregory M. 2006. “Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships in the United States: A 
Social Science Perspective.” American Psychologist 61(6): 607-621. 
Kousser, Thad, and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. "Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives and Policy 
Making by Direct Democracy." Southern California Law Review 78: 949-984. 
Krislov, Marvin, and Daniel M. Katz. 2008. "Taking State Constitutions Seriously." Cornell 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 17(2): 295-342. 
Lax, Jeffrey R., and Justin H. Phillips. 2009. “Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and 
Policy Responsiveness.” Manuscript, Columbia University. 
Matsusaka, John G. 2004. For the Many or the Few: The Initiative, Public Policy, and American 
Democracy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Matsusaka, John G. 2007a. "Institutions and Popular Control of Public Policy." Manuscript, 
University of Southern California. 
Matsusaka, John G. 2007b. "Direct Democracy and Social Issues." Manuscript, University of 
Southern California. 
Penn, Elizabeth Maggie. 2008. "A Model of Farsighted Voting." Manuscript, Harvard 
University.
Riggle, Ellen D.B., Jerry D. Thomas, and Sharon S. Rostosky. 2005. "The Marriage Debate and 
Minority Stress." PS: Political Science and Politics 38(2):221-224. 
Segura, Gary M. 2005. “A Symposium on the Politics of Same-Sex Marriage – An Introduction 
and Commentary.” PS: Political Science and Politics 38(2):189-193. 
Shipan, Charles R. and William R. Lowry. 2001. “Environmental Policy and Party Divergence in 
Congress.” Political Research Quarterly 54(2):245-263. 
Wu, Nina. 2008. "Momentum Gaining for Same-Sex Marriage. Honolulu Star-Tribune, June 28. 
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2008/06/29/business/story03.html.
Fi
gu
re
 1
: P
ub
lic
 o
pi
ni
on
 a
nd
 m
ar
ri
ag
e 
am
en
dm
en
ts
36
37
Fi
gu
re
 2
.  
C
om
pa
ri
so
ns
 o
f A
tti
tu
de
s a
nd
 O
ut
co
m
es
 b
y 
St
at
e 
T
yp
e 
Fi
gu
re
 3
. C
on
st
itu
tio
na
l C
ha
ng
e 
Fl
ow
 C
ha
rt
 
B
ol
d 
fo
nt
 re
pr
es
en
ts
 w
he
th
er
 o
r n
ot
 a
 st
at
e 
is
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
co
ns
tit
ut
io
na
l a
m
en
dm
en
t t
ha
t r
es
tri
ct
s s
am
e-
se
x 
m
ar
ria
ge
. R
ed
 
ar
ro
w
s o
n 
th
e 
fig
ur
e 
in
di
ca
te
 p
la
ce
s w
he
re
 a
tti
tu
de
 sh
ift
s c
an
 a
ff
ec
t c
on
st
itu
tio
na
l o
ut
co
m
es
 d
ire
ct
ly
 b
y 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
vo
te
s c
as
t o
n 
pr
op
os
ed
 a
m
en
dm
en
ts
 th
at
 m
ak
e 
it 
on
 to
 E
le
ct
io
n 
D
ay
 b
al
lo
ts
. B
lu
e 
ar
ro
w
s s
ho
w
 w
he
re
 sh
ift
in
g 
pu
bl
ic
 a
tti
tu
de
s o
n 
an
y 
of
 a
 n
um
be
r o
f 
is
su
es
 c
an
 le
ad
 v
ot
er
s t
o 
el
ec
t p
er
so
ns
 w
ho
 h
av
e 
pa
rti
cu
la
r p
oi
nt
s o
f v
ie
w
 o
n 
th
e 
co
ns
tit
ut
io
na
l s
ta
tu
s o
f s
am
e-
se
x 
m
ar
ria
ge
.  
38
Figure 4. Public Opinion, Institutional Arrangements and Expectations 
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Table 1: Institutional Requirements for Passing Constitutional Amendments 
DCI Simple                       Complex 
Mult. Sessions 
Voter
Supermajority 
AZ AL DE HI
AR AK IA ID
CA CT IN IL
CO GA MA MN 
FL KS NY NH
MI KY PA TN*
MO LA TN* VA*
MT ME VA* WY
NE MD VT  
NV MS WI
ND NJ     
OH NM     
OK NC     
OR RI     
SD SC   
TX   
UT   
WA
WV
                                              Percent Passed 
100% 53% 31% 50%
Bold indicates states that have passed amendments restricting marriage 
* indicates states with both supermajority and multiple session requirements 
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Table 2: Legislative and Voter Requirements in Non-DCI States 
State Lower House Requirement Upper House Requirement VotersNeeded
AK 2/3 2/3 majority 
AL 3/5 3/5 majority 
CT 3/4 3/4 majority 
DE 2/3 2/3 N/A 
GA 2/3 2/3 majority 
HI 2/3 of both chambers in one session or a majority of both chambers in multiple sessions
majority 
of all 
voters 
IA majority of both chambers in multiple sessions majority 
ID 2/3 2/3 
majority 
of all 
voters 
IL 3/5 3/5 
3/5 of 
those 
voting on 
question 
or 
majority 
of those 
voting in 
election
IN majority majority majority 
KS 2/3 2/3 majority 
KY 3/5 3/5 majority 
LA 2/3 2/3 majority 
MA majority majority majority 
MD 3/5 3/5 majority 
ME 2/3 2/3 majority 
MN majority majority 
majority 
of all 
voters 
MS 2/3 2/3 majority 
NC 3/5 3/5 majority 
NH 3/5 3/5 2/3 
NJ 3/5 3/5 majority 
NM majority majority majority 
NY majority majority majority 
PA majority majority majority 
RI majority majority majority 
SC 2/3 2/3 majority 
TN
A majority of both chambers in one session and then 2/3 of each chamber in a 
second session 
majority 
of all 
voters 
TX 2/3 2/3 majority 
UT 2/3 2/3 majority 
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VA majority majority 
majority 
of all 
voters 
VT 2/3 majority majority 
WA 2/3 2/3 majority 
WI majority majority majority 
WV 2/3 2/3 majority 
WY 2/3 2/3 
majority 
of all 
voters 
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Table 3: Expectations for non-DCI states. = correct
No Amendment Expected
Procedural requirement or 
election day requirement not 
satisfied since 1998 
Amendment Expected
Procedural and election day 
requirement simultaneously 
satisfied since 1998
Alaska Alabama
Connecticut Georgia
Delaware  Idaho
Hawaii Louisiana
Iowa North Carolina
Illinois Pennsylvania
Indiana  South Carolina
Kansas Tennessee
Kentucky Texas
Massachusetts Utah
Maryland Virginia
Maine Wisconsin
Minnesota Wyoming
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Rhode Island
Vermont
Washington
West Virginia 
